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June 26, 2013
Joanna L. Grossman

DOMA is Dead: The Supreme Court Rules in United States v. Windsor that the Defense of
Marriage Act is Unconstitutional

On the tenth anniversary of its leading gay rights decision,
Lawrence v. Texas (http://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/539/558/case.html) , the Supreme Court ruled that the
federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), passed in 1996 in haste to ward off samesex marriage in the states, is
unconstitutional. As in Lawrence, Justice Kennedy wrote the majority opinion in United States v. Windsor
(http://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/570/12307/) , and the more conservative justices dissented.
The same day, the Court also issued an opinion in Hollingsworth v. Perry
(http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/12pdf/12144_8ok0.pdf) , a case testing the constitutionality of Proposition 8,
California’s voter referendum making samesex marriage unconstitutional. In that case, however, the Court did
not reach the merits question—whether a state can ban samesex marriage without running afoul of the U.S.
Constitution—but instead dismissed the case on standing grounds. Because the state of California chose not to
defend Prop 8 after it was struck down by a district court judge, the voterdrafters of Prop 8 appealed the ruling
instead. In Perry, the Court ruled that only the state had standing to defend the law. In effect, this means that
Prop 8 is unconstitutional because the lower court ruling to that effect cannot be appealed. Even beyond
establishing the right of samesex marriage in California, however, this ruling is a victory for samesex marriage
advocates because the Court did not rule definitively that samesex marriage bans, which exist in threequarters
of the states, are constitutional. To the contrary, the signal from the Court in Windsor is that they are
constitutionally suspect on equal protection grounds.
DOMA: 19962013
When Congress enacted the Defense of Marriage Act in 1996, it was a sign that the samesex marriage wars were
heating up. The controversy began in earnest in the early 1990s (after failed challenges in the 1970s) when
advocates began filing lawsuits in state courts around the country challenging the validity of samesex marriage
bans on state constitutionality grounds. The heat came from Hawaii, which was poised to legalize samesex
marriage because of a ruling from the state’s highest court in 1993 that the ban merited strict scrutiny and was
likely to be struck down after a trial on remand. Congress acted swiftly to ward off claims of federal recognition
for samesex marriages celebrated in Hawaii or elsewhere.
DOMA’s death in 2013 marks the winding down of these same wars. While the early years of DOMA were
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marked by relatively few victories for samesex marriage advocates and many losses, the tide has shifted
dramatically. While at one point, samesex marriage was legal in only a single state (Massachusetts) and
expressly prohibited in fortyfour, it is now expressly permitted in thirteen (including California, by virtue of the
dismissal of the appeal on Prop 8 in Perry) and in the District of Columbia. And another halfdozen states offer a
status equivalent to marriage, such as a civil union or a robust form of the domestic partnership, which differ
from samesex marriage in name only. While 13/50 may still seem like a losing ratio, the real story is in how fast
the number went from one to thirteen, how many of the thirteen were the product of voluntary voter or legislative
enactment, and how many people live in those thirteen states versus how few in the remaining 37. After all,
almost twelve percent of the population lives just in California alone. The thirteen states together include
roughly thirty percent of the American population.
Moreover, public opinion has shifted dramatically in favor of samesex marriage. More than half of Americans
now support marriage equality for samesex couples, and support among younger adults is incredibly strong.
President Obama announced his support for gay marriage before winning reelection in November 2012, and still
won. Opponents of samesex marriage lost all four state voter referendums that dealt with the issue in the most
recent election. (I explain the particular referendums and results here (http://verdict.justia.com/2012/11/13/an
historicfirst) .)
There will continue to be controversy about samesex marriage, but the shifts at this point will all be in favor of
samesex marriage. And at some point, the Supreme Court will surely weigh in again and corral the stragglers,
as it did in Loving v. Virginia (http://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/388/1/case.html) in 1967 for the anti
miscegenation holdouts.
Challenges to DOMA’s Section Three
DOMA does two things. Section Two of the Act purports to give states the right to refuse recognition to same
sex marriages that have been celebrated in other states. This provision has never been invoked or challenged, in
part because it grants a power that states have long possessed anyway. Interstate marriage recognition statutes
are rooted in comity, rather than in the constitutional mandate of full faith and credit. Unless the Supreme Court
rules on the merits that it is unconstitutional for a state to ban samesex marriage (which it did not do in Perry),
states have the power to refuse recognition to samesex marriages from sister states.
Section Three is where the action is, and is the part of DOMA challenged in Windsor. It provides that, for any
federallaw purpose, the word “marriage” means only a legal union between one man and one woman, and a
“spouse” refers only to someone of the opposite sex. This provision has created chaos: Couples who were legally
married in their home states were nevertheless treated as single by the federal government for purposes ranging
from immigration, to taxes, to Social Security Accordingly, Section Three has been repeatedly challenged in
court. (As the Windsor opinion notes, the definition of marriage is relevant to over 1000 federal laws.) In the
past two years, four federal courts ruled that the federallaw provision of DOMA is unconstitutional. Litigation
in each of these cases was complicated by the decision of the Obama Administration (declared
(http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/February/11ag222.html) in the “Holder Memo,” in February 2011) to cease
defending Section Three in litigation because it believed the provision to be unconstitutional. The Bipartisan
Legal Advisory Group of the United States House of Representatives (BLAG) took up the mantle instead and
defended DOMA in court, including in the Windsor case just decided by the Supreme Court. But meanwhile, the
Executive Branch has continued to enforce Section Three.
United States v. Windsor: The Perfect Test for DOMA
Windsor illustrates a typical federalstate law conflict. In that case, the widow of a samesex spouse, who had
been married in Canada, sought (and won) a refund of estate taxes that would not have been owed had the federal
government given effect to the couple’s samesex marriage. (Transfers to a legal spouse at death are exempted
from the estate tax.) The IRS denied Windsor’s request for a refund on the grounds that she was not a “surviving
spouse” for estate tax purposes. At the time, New York did not allow for the celebration of valid samesex
marriages, but it did give effect to those that were validly celebrated elsewhere. Subsequently, the New York
legislature passed a law to legalize samesex marriage (a development I discuss here
http://verdict.justia.com/2013/06/26/domaisdead
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).
Edith Windsor challenged the estate tax assessment on the ground that the federallaw provision of DOMA was
unconstitutional. A federal district judge ruled in her favor, reasoning that Congress had no legitimate reason for
refusing to recognize marriages based solely on the sexual orientation of the parties. She ordered, without a stay
of the judgment, that the Internal Revenue Service refund over $350,000 to the decedent spouse’s estate.
The ruling was appealed to the Second Circuit, but before a decision came from that court, both parties petitioned
for certiorari before judgment—asking the Supreme Court to take the case immediately. While the petition was
pending, the Second Circuit did issue its ruling. It affirmed the trial court’s ruling in favor of the plaintiffs,
holding that sexual orientation classifications merit heightened scrutiny and that the government did not have
sufficiently good reasons for this one.
The question presented by the petitioner to the Supreme Court was this: “Whether Section 3 of DOMA violates
the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection of the laws as applied to persons of the same sex who are
legally married under the laws of their State.” In its order granting review, the Supreme Court asked the parties
to brief and argue not only the question presented, but also the question whether BLAG has standing to defend
DOMA in court.
The Supreme Court’s Ruling in United States v. Windsor: The Standing Issue
The Court first ruled on the standing issue it had asked the parties to brief. Federal courts can only hear a
“justiciable controversy.” One question was whether the federal government’s agreement with Windsor’s
position—that Section Three of DOMA is unconstitutional—meant there was no such controversy. But the
majority in Windsor reasoned that there was still a controversy because while the Obama Administration refused
to defend its constitutionality in court, its Executive Branch was continuing to enforce Section Three at the
agency level. The executive agency in question was the IRS, which was still refusing to give Windsor back her
estate taxes despite sharing her view that it should not have collected them in the first place. As Justice Kennedy
explained, “Windsor’s ongoing claim for funds that the United States refuses to pay thus establishes a
controversy sufficient for Article III jurisdiction.”
The Court was still concerned that the controversy would not be sharply fought if both sides agreed from the
start. But this sort of concern falls in the category of “prudential” limits on standing – ones that allow, but do not
force, the Court to decline review. And although the majority wrote that the “prudential grounds do not lack
substance,” it concluded that the “capable defense of the law by BLAG ensures that these prudential issues do not
cloud the merits question, which is one of immediate importance to the Federal Government and to hundreds of
thousands of persons.” The Court explained that BLAG’s “substantial argument” for the constitutionality of
Section Three and its “sharp adversarial presentation of the issues satisfies the prudential concerns that otherwise
might counsel against hearing an appeal from a decision with which the principal parties agree.” (A reasonable
reader might disagree about how sharply or capably BLAG’s brief presented the issues, although defending this
provision of DOMA was a tough task.)
United States v. Windsor: The Ruling on the Merits
The standing issue was a sideshow. The real question in this case was whether the United States has the
constitutional authority to refuse recognition to marriages based solely on the sex or sexual orientation of the
parties. The majority said no—it is a violation of equal protection principles and an infringement on state
sovereignty for the federal government to take such a position. Justice Kennedy was joined in the opinion by
Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Kagan, and Sotomayor.
Justice Kennedy’s opinion reads much like his opinion in Lawrence v. Texas
(http://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/539/558/case.html) (2003), in which the Court ruled 63 that state
criminal bans on samesex sexual behavior violate the right to privacy protected in the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. (An analysis of Lawrence when it was first decided is available here
http://verdict.justia.com/2013/06/26/domaisdead
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(http://writ.news.findlaw.com/grossman/20030708.html) .) The majority opinion in that case was sensitive to the

developing social norms about gay rights and relationships and nuanced in its analysis of relevant constitutional
principles.
Kennedy’s analysis of the constitutional claim in Windsor begins by noting that “until recent years, many citizens
had not even considered the possibility that two persons of the same sex might aspire to occupy the same status
and dignity as that of a man and woman in lawful marriage.” And the belief that a man and woman are “essential
to the very definition” of marriage “became even more urgent, more cherished when challenged.” At the same
time, however, other people responded to the suggestion of samesex marriage with “the beginnings of a new
perspective, a new insight.” In a relatively short period of time, the “limitation of lawful marriage to
heterosexual couples, which for centuries had been deemed both necessary and fundamental, came to be seen in
New York and certain other States as an unjust exclusion.” The opinion also notes that New York’s decision to
legalize samesex marriage in 2011 came after “a statewide deliberative process that enabled its citizens to
discuss and weigh arguments for and against samesex marriage” and to “correct what its citizens and elected
representatives perceived to be an injustice that they had not earlier known or understood.”
Justice Kennedy then launched into a discussion of the traditional regulation of marriage. Although “by history
and tradition” marriage has been “treated as being within the authority and realm of the separate states,”
Congress has the authority to “make determinations that bear on marital rights and privileges” when acting “in
the exercise of its own proper authority.” Congress thus can, for example, refuse to grant citizenship rights to the
noncitizen spouse in a sham marriage (one entered into solely for purposes of procuring immigration rights)
even if the marriage would be valid for statelaw purposes. Congress can also make its own determinations about
marriage, if it chooses to, when doling out Social Security benefits, or impose special protections on spouses
under pension plans regulated by ERISA.
What makes DOMA different from these examples—and unconstitutional? Justice Kennedy writes of its “far
greater reach;” a “directive applicable to over 1,000 federal statutes and the whole realm of federal regulations.”
Moreover, DOMA is targeted at a single class of persons, a class that a dozen states have sought specifically to
protect. But its reach alone does not dictate its validity. The majority opinion notes that marriage has
traditionally been the province of the states. State laws must conform to constitutional rights (a principle applied
in Loving, mentioned above), but within those parameters, states have largely been left to determine the rules
regarding entry into, conduct of, and exit from marriage. The federal government, Kennedy notes, “through our
history, has deferred to statelaw policy decisions with respect to domestic relations.” As a general matter, this is
certainly true. Whether or not the federal government has the power to define marriage (or other aspects of
family status), it has largely chosen not to. The vast majority of federal laws that turn on marital status rely on
state definitions, rather than supplying their own. And those state laws vary, although not to the degree that they
once did.
It is against this background, Justice Kennedy writes, that “DOMA rejects the longestablished precept that the
incidents, benefits, and obligations of marriage are uniform for all married couples within each States, though
they may vary, subject to constitutional guarantees, from one State to the next.” But, as he correctly notes, the
background is descriptive, but not necessarily prescriptive. Can the federal government choose to act against this
longstanding tradition of deference to the states? The majority did not rule on this issue per se. Kennedy wrote
that the Court did not have to decide whether “this federal intrusion on state power is a violation of the
Constitution because it disrupts the federal balance.” Instead, the majority concluded, the problem is in the
nature of this particular intrusion.
Quoting Romer v. Evans (http://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/517/620/case.html) , in which the Court struck
down a voter referendum in Colorado that had prevented the legislature from passing any law designed to prevent
discrimination against gays and lesbians, Kennedy wrote: “Discriminations of an unusual character especially
suggest careful consideration to determine whether they are obnoxious to the constitutional provision.” In other
words, the federal government’s departure from the longstanding tradition of deference to state regulation of
marriage makes it suspect, but not necessarily invalid. And the fact that the federal government acted for the
“opposite purpose” of a state like New York, which acted to protect samesex relationships, makes it even more
suspect.
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The states, Kennedy wrote, are better situated to define marriage because the “dynamics of state government” are
designed “to allow the formation of consensus respecting the way the members of discrete community treat each
other in their daily contact and constant interaction with each other.” And when they define marriage, they are
doing more than imposing a “routine classification for purposes of certain statutory benefits.” They are, rather,
giving further “protection and dignity” to the bond between two people engaged in an intimate relationships. It
was recognition of these personal bonds that gave rise to the Court’s ruling in Lawrence, and the shift towards
gay rights that the decision triggered.
New York’s legalization of samesex marriage reflects “both the community’s considered perspective on the
historical roots of the institution of marriage and its evolving understanding of the meaning of equality.” Yet
DOMA, according to Kennedy’s opinion, “seeks to injure the very class New York seeks to protect. And, by
doing so, “it violates basic due process and equal protection principles applicable to the Federal Government.”
(Equal protection challenges against state laws are rooted in the Fourteenth Amendment; challenges against
federal laws come under the Fifth Amendment, which has been interpreted to protect both due process and equal
protection rights.) The Court wrote in Romer that the guarantee of equality “’must at the very least mean that a
bare congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot’ justify disparate treatment of that
group.” The more unusual a discriminatory law is, the more likely it is the product of animus. DOMA falls
squarely into this trap. As Kennedy wrote, “DOMA’s unusual deviation from the usual tradition of recognizing
and accepting state definitions of marriage here operates to deprive samesex couples of the benefits and
responsibilities that come with federal recognition of their marriages. This is strong evidence of a law having the
purpose and effect of disapproval of that class.” With DOMA, the “avowed purpose and practical effect” are to
“impose a disadvantage, a separate status, and so a stigma upon all who enter into samesex marriages made
lawful by the unquestioned authority of the States.” The very title of the act—the Defense of Marriage Act—
shows the federal government’s desire to exclude, and clear language in the legislative history shows Congress’
moral disapproval of homosexuality.
Kennedy concludes his opinion with a long and pointed critique of DOMA and its impact on samesex married
couples. The law diminishes “the stability and predictability of basic personal relations the State has found it
proper to acknowledge and protect.” It “undermines both the public and private significance of statesanctioned
marriages” by telling couples “and all the world” that “their otherwise valid marriages are unworthy of federal
recognition.” It imposes upon them a “secondtier marriage.” It “humiliates tens of thousands of children now
being raised by samesex couples” and “makes it even more difficult for the children to understand the integrity
and closeness of their own family its concord with other families in their community and in their daily lives.”
Samesex couples “have their lives burdened . . . in visible and public ways.” The law touches “many aspects of
married and family life, from the mundane to the profound.” And it does all this under the guise of a law whose
“principal purpose and necessary effect” are to “demean those persons who are in a lawful samesex marriage.”
The Court thus holds “that DOMA is unconstitutional as a deprivation of the liberty of the person protected by
the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution.” The statute “is invalid, for no legitimate purpose overcomes the
purpose and effect to disparage and to injure those whom the State, by its marriage laws, sought to protect in
personhood and dignity.” Then, in the last sentence, the majority wrote that its “opinion and holding are
confined to those lawful marriages,” preempting any argument that Windsor, alone, invalidates state bans on
samesex marriage.
Three separate dissents to the opinion were filed by Justices Roberts, Scalia and Alito. Two of these opinions
focused primarily on the question of standing. Both Justices Scalia and Roberts argued that the Court lacked
jurisdiction to review the lower court decision in Windsor. They both also wrote and argued that the law was
constitutional on the merits. Justice Roberts wrote that “interests in uniformity and stability amply justified
Congress’s decision to retain the definition of marriage that, at that very point, had been adopted by every State
in our Nation, and every nation in the world.” Justice Scalia argues that the majority’s decision and reasoning
“spring forth from the same diseased root: an exalted conception of the role of this institution in America.” This
comment is ironic given Scalia’s joining of the majority opinion in Shelby County v. Holder
(http://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/570/1296/) earlier this week, in which the Court struck down the core
component of the Voting Rights Act as unconstitutional despite the express delegation of authority to Congress
under the Fifteenth Amendment. Justice Alito wrote to argue that the Constitution has no opinion about the
http://verdict.justia.com/2013/06/26/domaisdead
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validity of samesex marriage: “It leaves the choice to the people, acting through their elected representatives at
both the federal and state levels.”
Conclusion
The ruling in Windsor brings a chaotic and sordid chapter of our national history to an end. Regardless of
diverging views about the desirability of samesex marriage, the administrative chaos and arbitrary unfairness
wrought by DOMA had to end. While Congress had considered bills to repeal DOMA, it did not appear close to
passing one. The Court has now saved Congress the trouble and, in the course of doing so, has also protected the
dignity and equality of couples who have been singled out for disadvantage.
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